Former military president, General Ibrahim Babangida (retd) has made some shocking revelations.
Babangida made the revelations in his autobiography titled; “A Journey in Service.”
He wrote: “Although I am on record to have stated after the elections that Abiola may not have won the elections, upon deeper reflection and a closer examination of all the available facts, particularly the detailed election results, which are published as an appendix to this volume, there was no doubt that MKO Abiola won the June 12 elections.”
“Upon closer examination of the original collated figures from the 110,000 polling booths nationwide, it was clear that he satisfied the two main constitutional requirements for winning the presidential elections, mainly majority votes and geographical spread, having obtained 8,128,720 votes against Tofa’s 5,848,247 votes and securing the mandatory one-third of the votes cast in 28 states of the federation, including Abuja.”
“Unfortunately, the forces gathered against him after the June 12 elections were so formidable that I was convinced that if he became President, he would be quickly eliminated by the same forces who pretended to be his friends.”
“While I accept that the unfortunate denial of his mandate amounted to a subversion of the will of the Nigerian people, I was petrified that if Abiola got killed, it could lead to a civil war.”
“Having participated in one civil war, with all its horrors, pains and devastation, I wasn’t prepared to see another.”
“I am gratified that the Buhari administration finally recognised MKO Abiola as a ‘former head of state.”
Regrettable moment in Nigeria’s history.”
“There were no questions that mistakes were made in the handling of the June 12 elections and their aftermath, for which I take full responsibility as President and Commander-in-Chief. One of my biggest mistakes was failing to firmly secure the support and firm commitment of my military colleagues to the Transition programme from the beginning.”
“We completely underestimated the deep opposition to civil rule within the military top hierarchy. We underestimated the damage that the extended stay in the political arena, with all its perks, had done to the military psyche and the psychological shock that would accompany an eventual withdrawal from much temptingly appealing political positions.”
“We further underestimated what it would take to return the military to the barracks and its non-political and non-partisan role.”
“Looking back now, the June 12 saga was undeniably the most challenging moment of my life and in certain respects, one of the most painful. I don’t remember who first said that ‘sometimes, life can only be understood backwards.’”
“However, faced with the circumstances of those moments as President and Commander-in-Chief, painful as it seemed, I did what was in the country’s best interest, for which I take full responsibility.”
“Even more bizarre was the extent of the annulment because it terminated all court proceedings regarding the June 12 elections, repealed all the decrees governing the transition, and even suspended NEC (National Electoral Commission)!”
“Admiral Aikhomu’s press secretary, Nduka Irabor, had read out a terse, poorly worded statement from a scrap of paper, which bore neither the presidential seal nor the official letterhead of the government, annulling the June 12 presidential elections. I was alarmed and horrified.”
“But to suddenly have an announcement made without my authority was, to put it mildly, alarming. I remember saying: ‘These nefarious inside forces opposed to the elections have outflanked me.”
“There and then, I knew I was caught between the devil and the deep blue sea!”
“I acknowledge that the election which was widely regarded as Nigeria’s freest and fairest, took a “painful twist” from that moment and I ultimately bore the responsibility for what transpired. As I will show later, I regrettably take responsibility.”
“Tensions in the country were compounded by baseless conspiracy theories meant to justify the annulment. One such theory was that Abiola had penciled down a list of top military officers to be dismissed upon assuming office as president.”
“Another conspiracy theory was that the government had let the June 12 elections go ahead in the knowledge, based on security reports, that Tofa would win. However, once Abiola won, the government sought a way to frustrate his mandate.”
“These were spurious theories circulated by those opposed to an Abiola presidency. Some persons indeed expressed their reservations about an Abiola presidency before the elections.”
“There were times when, deep down inside me, I even feared that Abiola might not be an effective president. However, having allowed the process to go ahead in which Abiola appeared to have emerged victorious in an election deemed the freest and fairest in our country’s history, I was committed to ensuring that the results should stand. To do otherwise would amount to a subversion of the will of the Nigerian people.”
“But I also knew we were dealing with a delicate situation that could lead to national disintegration. The military was factionalised into rival groups between those opposed to the transition to civil rule, particularly an Abiola presidency, and those who thought the military should keep its word and hand over to a democratically elected government.”
“The military was awash with rumours of plots by those who wanted to depose me to have Abiola installed and those who wanted to take me out violently to ensure that the annulment stayed.”
“There were rumours of a third group, made up of sworn and implacable enemies of Abiola, a hard-line faction, who threatened that Abiola could only be President over their dead bodies! And if it meant taking me out violently to effect their threat, they were willing to do so.”
“It was painful for me to discover later that apart from Abacha, some of my closest colleagues were knee-deep in the plot to eliminate me.
“The only reason those disparate forces did not strike against me was that it was feared, and rightly so, that since I still enjoyed the support of a sizable proportion of the armed forces, any attack on the government or my person would lead to a bloodbath.
“The polarisation within the military was so fraught with danger that the best I could do in the circumstance was to project a united front as government in the face of the stiff opposition I faced as President.
“Although the annulment took all by surprise, as Commander-in-Chief, I took responsibility for it. In my speech on June 26, tepid and disingenuous as it may seem, I attempted to justify the annulment in the face of supposed nationwide widespread electoral malpractices during the elections! What mattered at the time to me as President and Commander-in-Chief was the unity of the army and my conviction that if the army was united, it could safeguard the country from disintegration.”
“After several brainstorming sessions with various groups, I contacted M.K.O Abiola to find a way forward. At one of my several meetings with Abiola, arranged this time by some traditional leaders, I offered Abiola an interim position pending when we could resolve the situation.”
“Not surprisingly, Abiola turned down my offer. How could anyone blame him? Since he was convinced that he had won the elections that the annulment had denied him, it seemed overtly inappropriate to accept an interim arrangement.”
“For him, it was a matter of once bitten, twice shy. At another meeting, this time a more private meeting of both families, I articulated that our lives were in danger of being snuffed out by lurking forces that wished both of us ill.”
“Unfortunately, Abiola turned his back on any form of rapprochement with me and embraced the gimmicks of deceitful ‘friends’ who hid their real intentions from him.”
“I read somewhere, I believe, in one of Abiola’s newspapers that Abiola thought that the moment these ‘friends’ overthrew me, the elections would be de-annulled and that he would be installed as President by his coup-plotting friends.”
“As it turned out, Abiola was advised by these same ‘friends’ to leave the country to avoid death threats from fictitious military elements. Abiola’s departure paved the way for his ‘friends’ to consolidate their conspiratorial positions, eventually leading to another military takeover.”
“Without question, one of my biggest headaches at this time was Sani Abacha. I knew that Abacha was ambivalent about a return to civil rule. But I thought, in retrospect now, naively, that he would support our transition to the civil rule programme.